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INTRODUCTION
In 1916, Julius Henry Cohen—the subject of this conference—took
up the now-perennial debate concerning whether law is a business or
a profession, coming down on the side that, although legal practice
had become too commercialized of late, law was and should be a
profession.1 In 2010, Tom Morgan—one of the participants in this
conference—addressed the same question in his book The Vanishing
American Lawyer and provocatively concluded, contrary to Cohen,
that “Law in America is not a profession—and that’s a good thing.”2

* Professor of Law and Nancy Barton Scholar, Boston University School of Law. ©
2012 Nancy J. Moore. All rights reserved.
1. JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? 318–19 (1916).
For an excellent discussion of this book, see Samuel J. Levine, Rediscovering Julius

Henry Cohen and the Origins of the Business/Profession Dichotomy: A Study in the
Discourse of Early Twentieth Century Legal Professionalism, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
1 (2005).
2. THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 66 (2010)
[hereinafter MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER]. He has addressed
these questions in other publications as well. See, e.g., Thomas D. Morgan, Calling
Law a ‘Profession’ Only Confuses Thinking About the Challenges Lawyers Face, 9
UNIV. OF ST. THOMAS L.J. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Morgan, Calling Law a
Profession], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2007296; Thomas D. Morgan,
Toward Abandoning Organized Professionalism, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 947 (2002)
[hereinafter Morgan, Abandoning Organized Professionalism]. In my discussion of
Morgan’s views throughout this Article, I will draw from these two articles, as well as
from the book itself.
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For Cohen, the commercialization of law practice—including not
only advertising, but also the growing number of lawyers serving the
interests of business clients—was antithetical to the ideals of
professionalism, in which rather than “being drawn into modern
business,” lawyers should be “standing outside it.”3 For Morgan,
however, lawyers are and should be recognized as primarily economic
actors.4 Indeed, he encourages them to work toward breaking down
the barriers that continue to exist between lawyers and other business
persons who can offer comparable (perhaps even better) services at
lower prices.5
What, if any, are the implications of globalization—including the
increased globalization of law practice6—for the perennial debate
concerning the professional status of lawyers in the United States and
elsewhere? Of course, Cohen did not live to witness the globalization
phenomenon and therefore was unable to comment on its
implications for his ideal of law as a profession. Morgan, on the other
hand, is an astute observer of globalization and its impact on law
practice, including radical changes in lawyer regulation recently
enacted in the U.K. and Australia7—changes that have many U.S.
lawyers “up in arms.”8 For Morgan, globalization represents the
culmination of a lengthy process of eliminating restrictive barriers
that were established at the behest of lawyer organizations such as the
American Bar Association (ABA), in an effort to establish and
reinforce lawyers’ monopoly over a wide range of commercial
activity.9
According to Morgan, this process of breaking down barriers
between lawyers and nonlawyers—and between elite and non-elite
lawyers—began in the United States in the 1960s with a series of
Supreme Court decisions striking down various anticompetitive rules
adopted by state courts at the request of lawyer organizations, such as
3. COHEN, supra note 1, at 31 (quoting Woodrow Wilson’s 1910 address to the
American Bar Association).
4. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 25.
5. See, e.g., MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 97
(disapproving as “self-defeating” lawyers’ efforts to challenge the use of online
services helping people attempting to draft their own legal documents).
6. See, e.g., Colloquium, Globalization and the Legal Profession, 80 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2305 (2012).
7. See MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 90.
8. Jennifer Smith, Law Firms Split Over Nonlawyer Investors, WALL ST. J., Apr.
2, 2012, at B1(quoting one U.S. lawyer as saying, “I can’t think of anything more
pernicious or ill-considered”).
9. See MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 71–83.

MOORE_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBALIZATION

4/15/2013 5:47 PM

219

minimum legal fees, advertising bans, and restrictions on the efforts
of nonlawyer organizations to secure affordable legal services for
their members.10 More recently, changes in the economy itself—
including the lifting of trade barriers and revolutions in transportation
and information technology—have led to an unprecedented growth in
international commerce, accompanied by a “degree of competitive
pressure unknown when markets were more narrow and
balkanized.”11 As a result of these changes, U.S. lawyers seeking to
participate in the new global economy must be prepared to provide
the services that their clients need, in all parts of the world, at prices
that are competitive with those offered by other legal service
providers—lawyers and nonlawyers alike—who are themselves
located throughout the world, including China, India, Russia, Brazil,
and Dubai.12
Morgan recognizes that U.S. lawyers are affected by international
developments in lawyer regulation, including international trade
agreements like the General Agreement on Trade and Services
(GATS), which aims to break down barriers to the smooth flow of
goods and services (including legal services) between the world’s
nations.13 Among the other important developments Morgan cites
are the recent reforms in lawyer regulation in the U.K. and
Australia,14 which permit not only nonlawyer participation in the
management and ownership of law firms, but also the creation of
entirely new business structures in which lawyers will collaborate with
nonlawyers to provide a wide range of legal and nonlegal services.15
10. See id. at 73–77. Here, Morgan discusses such seminal cases as Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (striking down minimum legal fees), Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (striking down prohibition of lawyer
advertising of fixed fees for routine legal services), and Brotherhood of Trainmen v.
Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (striking down ethical standards
that prevented a union from establishing a list of lawyers whom the union had found
to be competent in handling job-related deaths or injuries).
11. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 87.
12. Id. at 85.
13. Id. at 89.
14. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
15. For a description of these changes, see generally Judith Maute, Global

Continental Shifts to a New Governance Paradigm in Lawyer Regulation and
Consumer Protection: Riding the Wave, reprinted in ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES
LAWYERS AND LEGAL ETHICS: REIMAGINING THE PROFESSION 11 (Francesca
Bartlett et al. eds., 2011). See also Ted Schneyer, Thoughts on the Compatibility of

ON

Recent U.K. and Australian Reforms with U.S. Traditions in Regulating Law
Practice, 2009 J. PROF. LAW 13, 15 (2009); Steve Mark et al., Preserving the Ethics
and Integrity of the Legal Profession in an Evolving Market: A Comparative
Regulatory
Response
(n.d.)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
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At first glance, these international developments appear to
constitute unequivocal support for Morgan’s view that, if law ever
was a profession in the United States and elsewhere, globalization
inevitably will hasten its demise, forcing lawyers into head-to-head
competition with nonlawyers and encouraging them to combine with
nonlawyers to form business structures just like those encountered
elsewhere in the commercial world. But closer inspection may yield a
different interpretation of these events.
In my view, what
globalization suggests is that U.S. lawyers should adopt a more
nuanced view of the perennial debate, shedding light not only on
what it means for an occupation to constitute a profession, but also on
the question whether professions and professionalization might
ultimately provide a net benefit to society and are therefore worth
preserving, although in a somewhat different form than they have
previously taken.
In Part I of this Article, I address the implications of globalization
for answering the question of whether law is indeed a profession. In
Part II, I address the implications of globalization for the entirely
separate question of whether law should be a profession—that is,
whether lawyer organizations and individual lawyers ought to
continue to work toward realizing a vision of professionalism that can
benefit the public in the United States and elsewhere. I then
conclude by discussing the continuing relevance of Julius Henry
Cohen’s views for the ongoing debate over the future of law as a
profession.
I. IS LAW A PROFESSION?
For all their differences, Cohen and Morgan appear to share a
vision of what it means to claim that law is a profession rather than a
business. Both focus almost exclusively on the assumption that an
occupation is a profession only if its members actually serve the
public interest by placing the needs of the community above their
own selfish interests.16 Cohen then presents some evidence that
lawyers in fact have acted in the public interest—for example, by
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/olsc/ll_olsc.nsf/vwFiles/UK_paper.doc/%24file
/UK_paper.doc.
16. See COHEN, supra note 1, at 31–32 (citing Woodrow Wilson’s 1910 address to
the American Bar Association, in which Wilson appealed to individual lawyers not to
be “sucked into the channels of business” but rather to become “statesmen,” that is,
“lawyers who can think in the terms of society itself”); MORGAN, THE VANISHING
AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 50–51 (citing ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER
FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953)).
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volunteering their services to “purg[e] the profession of those who
fall below the standards of the profession itself.”17
Morgan, however, argues that law is not a profession, citing a lack
of evidence that lawyers are or ever were “a separate and superior
class.”18 Indeed, Morgan also argues that lawyers themselves made
no such claim until the ABA and others orchestrated a
professionalism project, that is, a campaign designed to “achieve
political influence and economic advancement,”19 including a
monopoly over the right to render legal services and control over the
admission and regulation of lawyers. In his view, although some
individual lawyers have the personal characteristics typically
associated with the professions (dedication to the public good and
willingness to sacrifice one’s individual well-being for higher goals),
the organized bar has abused whatever privileges it has obtained,
citing “lawyers’ tendency to use that supposed authority to pursue
their own political agendas and self-interest over the interests of
justice and the public.”20
For sociologists like Eliot Freidson, however, what primarily
distinguishes a profession from other occupations is the fact that the
members of a profession “control their own work.”21 In connection
with his service as a member of the ABA Commission on
Professionalism, Freidson defined the legal profession as “[a]n
occupation whose members have special privileges, such as exclusive

17. COHEN, supra note 1, at 22. Cohen then poses the following rhetorical
question to business men: “How many of your craft give ten per cent per annum of
their time to eliminating from their industry or trade the black sheep that are freely
roaming about?” Id.
18. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 40.
19. Id. at 55.
20. Morgan, Calling Law a Profession, supra note 2, at 7; see also Morgan,
Abandoning Organized Professionalism, supra note 2, at 950 (to warrant privilege of
self-regulation, the occupation must present evidence that the “‘occupation as a
corporate body is able to control itself without abusing its privilege’ because of the
‘good character’ as well as the competence of its members” (quoting Eliot Freidson,
Professionalism as Model and Ideology, in LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES:
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 220 (Robert L. Nelson et
al. eds., 1992))). For Morgan’s view that the praiseworthy traits identified under the
rubric of professionalism ought to be viewed as the “personal traits” of individual
professionals, not of groups, see, e.g., MORGAN, THE VANISHING LAWYER, supra
note 2, at 21.
21. Eliot Freidson, Professionalism as Model and Ideology, in LAWYERS’
IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROFESSION 215 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992).
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licensing, that are justified by [certain] assumptions.”22 These
assumptions concern: 1) the existence of specialized knowledge; 2)
the inability of clients to evaluate the quality of service, resulting in
the need for clients to trust the practitioner; 3) the willingness of
practitioners to subordinate their own self-interest to the public good
(thereby justifying the client’s trust in the practitioner); and 4) the
self-regulating nature of the occupation, which is accomplished when
the occupation organizes itself “in such a way as to assure the public
. . . that its members are competent, do not violate their client’s trust,
and transcend their own self-interest.”23 Of course, these assumptions
may turn out to be ill-founded, in which case we would expect the
occupation to lose its “special privileges.”24 Nevertheless, so long as
the public permits the occupation to be self-regulating, the occupation
would appear, as a matter of descriptive reality, to constitute a
“profession.”25
Morgan apparently concedes this point;26
nevertheless, he continues to insist that lawyers’ conduct—
particularly, the conduct of lawyer organizations—has never justified

22. ABA COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, “....IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:”
A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 10 (1986).
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Nancy J. Moore, Professionalism Reconsidered, 12 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 773, 784 (1987).
25. Cf. John M. Conley, Is Law Really a Profession? Review of The Vanishing
American Lawyer, by Thomas D. Morgan, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1183, 1187
(2011) (arguing that law is a profession “in one—perhaps the most—important
sense” because lawyers “have a monopoly over the provision of many kinds of
services” and “[s]tate governments have also delegated to us the privilege of selfregulation”).
26. See MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 66 (“No
one can deny, for example, that the right to practice law is extensively regulated.
One must take special training, undergo special testing and be specially licensed to
practice law, and the license may be taken away if the lawyer fails to adhere to a
jurisdiction’s rules of professional conduct. The rules to which lawyers are held, in
turn, have been proposed by bar associations composed of lawyers and imposed by
judges who are themselves lawyers. The sociologist’s definition of a profession would
seem to be confirmed.” (footnotes omitted)). Elsewhere, however, Morgan rejects
the “contract” version of professionalism, insisting that there never was a “social
contract” and that for the “hypothetical contract” to have credibility “there must be a
sense that people at the time of the alleged contract would have seen it as desirable.”
Id. at 25. I argue, to the contrary, that the fact that public representatives have
permitted the organized bar to play a significant role in the regulation of lawyers is
evidence supporting the “hypothetical contract” model for professional selfregulation. I have endorsed this model elsewhere. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 24.
For more recent support of the hypothetical contract model, see Neil Hamilton, The
Profession and Professionalism Are Dead? A Review of Thomas Morgan, The
Vanishing American Lawyer, 20 PROF. LAW. 14 (2010).
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their historical ability to play a significant role in their own regulation.
In that sense, he argues, law has never been a true profession.
With respect to the “self-regulating” character of the legal
profession, Morgan believes that lawyer organizations vastly
overstate their authority to make their own rules. For example, in a
recent article, Morgan described the ABA’s recent effort to defeat a
“collaborative law” initiative proposed by the National Commission
on Uniform State Laws.27 As part of that effort, the ABA argued that
“acknowledging the power of states to adopt new legal processes and
lawyer regulation [through legislation] was contrary to the
professional ideal that lawyers regulate themselves.”28 Morgan rejects
this claim as “preposterous,”29 and he is right to do so. Consider, for
example, the extent to which some U.S. state legislatures actively
regulate various aspects of lawyer conduct,30 as well as the recent
proliferation of lawyer regulations that the executive and legislative
branches of the federal government have promulgated.31 But Morgan
may not be correct in his conclusion that such partial incursions on
the autonomy of lawyers necessarily prove that law is no longer a
profession (if it ever was). 32

27. Morgan, Calling Law a Profession, supra note 2, at 11–13.
28. Id. at 12 (adding that “[n]ever before, the opponents argued, had the ABA
recognized a legislative power of lawyer regulation, and even though the NCUSL
proposal took the form of proposed court rules as well, the ABA could not take the
risk that a legislature might act instead”).
29. Id. at 13.
30. In California, for example, the state legislature is a co-regulator of the legal
profession, along with the California Supreme Court. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
div. 3, arts. 5, 6 (West 2003) (Attorneys); CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-100
(2013). In some other jurisdictions, courts are the primary regulators, but they
permit a wide range of legislative regulation that does not directly conflict with the
state court’s authority to regulate. See, e.g., Crowe v. Tull, 126 P.3d 196 (Colo. 2006)
(upholding use of state consumer protection law to sue lawyers for false advertising);
Newton v. Cox, 878 S.W.2d 105 (Tenn. 1994) (upholding legislation limiting
attorney’s fees in medical malpractice cases).
31. See, e.g., John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 959
(2009); Schneyer, supra note 15.
32. Morgan is also aware, as others have frequently noted, that lawyers and
lawyer organizations have never been truly self-regulating in the United States
because it is courts (and not lawyer organizations) that adopt and enforce rules of
professional conduct. See MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note
2, at 66 & n.168. Nevertheless, he observes, as others have, that “[t]he rules to which
lawyers are held . . . have been proposed by bar associations composed of lawyers
and imposed by judges who are themselves lawyers.” Id. at 66; see also Schneyer,
supra note 15, at 14 (describing the “self-regulatory” nature of U.S. regulatory
traditions as “still the most comprehensive feature of our regulatory framework”).
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What do globalization and the recent developments in lawyer
regulation in the U.K. and Australia contribute to the question of
whether law is or can remain a self-regulatory profession in any
meaningful sense of the term? Consider the fact that, even prior to
recent reforms, the authority to regulate lawyers in both the U.K. and
Australia was located in the legislative branch of government, not the
courts, as it is in most U.S. states.33 Nevertheless, the legislatures in
those countries had historically delegated the regulation of lawyers
directly to the relevant professional bodies.34 In this respect, lawyers
in both the U.K. and Australia were more self-regulating than U.S.
lawyers, who are regulated primarily by the judicial branch of state
government, with courts providing a not insignificant check on the
ability of bar associations to write their own rules and discipline their
own members.35 As a result of the recent reforms, however, these
same legislatures intervened to override particular professional rules,
that is, rules that restricted the ability of lawyers to collaborate with
nonlawyers in the provision of legal or multidisciplinary services.36 In
addition, the legislatures created independent, external agencies that
will now play a significant role in the regulation of lawyers, including
oversight of the lawyer disciplinary process and primary responsibility
for consumer complaints seeking redress from legal professionals.37
Moreover, in the U.K., that agency, the Legal Services Board, will
have a chairperson and a majority of its members who are

33. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 15, at 14 (“Like the state supreme courts in the
U.S., the legislatures in [the U.K. and Australia] traditionally delegated a substantial
regulatory role to the organized bar.”).
34. See, e.g., Maute, supra note 15, at 14 (describing 1993 report on the
disciplinary process as administered by the professional bodies in New South Wales,
Australia); id. at 19 (describing a thirty-year effort by U.K. government to pressure
legal professional bodies to improve the quality of self-regulation, including a 1990
act creating a legal Services Ombudsman to oversee complaint handling by the same
bodies).
35. See, e.g., Nancy J. Moore, “In the Interests of Justice”: Balancing Client
Loyalty and the Public Good in the Twenty-First Century, 70 FORDHAM L. REV.
1775, 1788–89 (2002) (arguing that “many state courts have done quite well in
carrying out their responsibility to promulgate state ethics codes with provisions that
reflect not merely the bar’s desires and wishes, but also the public interest”); Fred
Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147 (2009).
36. See SRA CODE OF CONDUCT R. 8 (2007) (U.K.) (prohibition against feesharing with nonlawyers); id. R. 12 (prohibition against practicing in partnership with
nonlawyer); id. R. 14 (prohibition against practicing in corporate body with
nonlawyer director, member or shareholder).
37. Maute, supra note 15, at 14–16 (Australia); id. at 19 (U.K.).
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laypersons—that is, individuals who are not authorized to engage in
activities reserved to legal professionals.38
Nevertheless, despite these radical incursions on lawyer selfregulation, the relevant lawyer organizations in the U.K. and
Australia have not become mere trade associations, as
“deprofessionalization”39 would appear to dictate; rather, they have
become “co-regulators,”40 along with the legislatively established
external agencies. In the U.K., the Law Society created the Solicitors
Regulatory Authority (SRA) as a regulatory entity independent from
the Law Society, which remains as the representative association of
solicitors.41 The SRA will have primary authority as a “frontline”
regulator42 for “‘regulatory arrangements’ concerning rules of
conduct, discipline, education, licensure, indemnification and
compensation for redress or misconduct,”43 although the legislation
itself dictates the regulatory objectives that the SRA must promote
and establishes an independent Office of Legal Complaints (OLC) to
investigate and resolve all complaints seeking redress from solicitors
and other legal service providers.44 In Australia, state legislation in
New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria also established “coregulatory systems in which an independent Legal Services
Commissioner (LSC [or OLSC]) oversees enforcement activities,
which may be delegated to the relevant professional bodies.”45
What about the new business structures in which lawyers will share
ownership and management with nonlawyers? In the U.K., the
recent legislation established both Legal Disciplinary Practices
(LDP), in which approved nonlawyers may participate so long as they
do not own or control more than twenty-five percent of the practice,
38. Id.
39. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Professions Are Dead, Long Live the
Professions: Legal Practice in a Postprofessional World, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 713,
715 & n.3 (1999) (distinguishing between the use of the term “postprofessionalism”
to mean deprofessionalization and to mean changes resulting in “a wholesale
reshaping of this ‘turn-of-the-millennium institution’”).
40. See Schneyer, supra note 15, at 27 (describing U.K. and New South Wales
reforms as providing for “co-regulation”); Maute, supra note 15, at 13 (noting that
both the U.K. and Australia have adopted a “co-regulatory model”).
41. See Schneyer, supra note 15, at 26 & n.48 (describing the perceived conflict
between the Law Society’s representative and regulatory authority, resulting in the
requirement of the Legal Services Act of 2007 that each professional body to
delegate its regulatory authority to an independent organization).
42. See Schneyer, supra note 15, at 27.
43. Maute, supra note 15, at 26.
44. Id. at 25–26.
45. Id. at 14.
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and
Alternative
Business
Structures
(ABS),
including
multidisciplinary practices and external ownership of legal businesses
(both private and public), in which the participation of approved
nonlawyers is not limited to any fixed percentage.46 Any firm that
intends to employ a nonlawyer as a manager of an LDP or as an
owner or manager of an ABS must apply to the SRA for approval of
that individual as “fit and proper to assume that role.”47 Lawyers in
both LDPs and ABSs remain subject to the regulatory authority of
the SRA, including discipline for violating the SRA-promulgated
rules of professional practice.48 Indeed, in LDPs, all employees are
regulated by the SRA; thus even nonlawyers are subject to all the
rules and regulations that are applicable to lawyers.49 An ABS must
have at least one manager who is authorized to provide the legal
services offered by the ABS and must appoint a Head of Legal
Practice (HOLP), who is a lawyer responsible for ensuring
compliance with the ABS’s license and for reporting to the licensing
authority any failure to comply with the terms of the license.50
In New South Wales, recent legislation approved multidisciplinary
practices (MDPs) and incorporated legal practices (ILPs), including
publicly listed practices.51 Solicitor members of both MDPs and ILPs
continue to be governed by the same rules as other solicitors;
moreover, upon incorporation, a legal practice must appoint at least
one legal practitioner director, who is generally responsible for the
management of any legal services provided.52 In addition to fulfilling
his or her own professional obligations, the legal practitioner director
must “implement and maintain ‘appropriate management systems’ to
enable the provision of legal services in accordance with the
professional obligations of solicitors and the other obligations
imposed under [the 2004 legislation],”53 including the responsibility to

46. Mark et al., supra note 15, at 27–30.
47. Id. at 33.
48. See, e.g., Schneyer, supra note 15, at 27 (describing the Law Society, acting
through the SRA, as one of several frontline regulators for each class of licensed
lawyers, with “responsibility for the day-to-day processing of complaints that allege
serious professional misconduct and for prosecuting disciplinary cases before a
specialized tribunal”).
49. Mark et al., supra note 15, at 29.
50. Id. at 32.
51. Id. at 3.
52. Id. at 5–6.
53. Id. at 22. With respect to publicly listed legal practices, the OLSC has
encouraged firms
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report to the Law Society of New South Wales any misconduct of a
solicitor employed by the practice. The purpose of such requirements
is “to ensure that the ethical and professional duties of solicitor
members of MDPs and corporations cannot be disturbed by the
requirements of other members.”54
As described above, the recent legislation in the U.K. and
Australia clearly contemplates that lawyer organizations will continue
to play a significant role in regulating their own conduct. Indeed,
implementation of the legislation in both situations suggests an even
stronger role not only for individual lawyers (through their lawyer
organizations), but also for law firms. Both the SRA in the U.K. and
the OLSC in New South Wales have announced the intended
implementation of “proactive, firm-based regulation”55 in which firms
are required to adopt an “ethical infrastructure,” that is, “formal and
informal management policies, procedures and controls, work-team
cultures, and habits of interaction . . . that support and encourage
ethical behavior.”56 As Ted Schneyer has observed, the type of firmbased regulation now being developed outside the United States,
particularly in New South Wales, contemplates the regulator as more
of a “consultant than an enforcer.”57 Indeed, Schneyer concludes that
“the emphasis on firm self-assessment and the concept of ‘working
toward compliance’ suggests that the program is truly collaborative,”58
thereby reflecting a continuing desire on the part of the public
representatives in those countries that lawyers remain significantly
independent and self-regulatory, in the manner of true professionals.

to preserve the ethics of legal practice by explicitly stating in the prospectus,
constituent documents and shareholder agreements that
- the primary duty of the legal practice is to the court
- the secondary duty is to the client;
- the third duty is to the shareholder; and
- that where there is a clash between legal profession regulation and the
Corporations Act, the legal profession regulation will prevail.
Id. at 6–7 (emphasis omitted).
54. Id. at 21.
55. Schneyer, supra note 15, at 30.
56. Schneyer, supra note 15, at 30–31 & n.63 (quoting STEVE MARK, THE FUTURE
IS HERE: GLOBALIZATION AND THE REGULATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, VIEWS
FROM AN AUSTRALIAN REGULATOR (2009)). Unlike the legislation in New South
Wales, the U.K. legislation itself mandated that approved regulators such as the SRA
develop a system of firm-based regulation. Id. at 33 n.77.
57. Id. at 34.
58. Id.
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II. SHOULD LAW BE A PROFESSION?
When professionalism is defined in accordance with what Morgan
describes as the sometimes “preposterous”59 claims of
“professionalism rhetoric”60—that is, claims that characterize lawyers
as a “separate and superior class”61—it is difficult to disagree with
Morgan that “professionalism in the sense developed by the ABA
during the twentieth century is—and should be seen as—dead.”62
Although Morgan often focuses on this particular aspect of
professionalism, he does not limit his disparagement of the concept to
such excesses of rhetorical zeal. Rather, he challenges the wisdom of
continuing to recognize lawyers as a separate occupational group and
permitting them—through “strong central organizations”—to play a
significant role in regulating the practice of law.63 He also objects to
“restrictive rules of practice,” which he views as integral to the
professionalism project.64
As we have seen, legislatures in both the U.K. and Australia have
continued to delegate significant self-regulatory functions to lawyer
organizations; moreover, they continue to reserve certain (but not all)
lawyer functions to particular segments of the legal profession.65 They
may have done so out of political necessity,66 but it is just as likely that
they did so because they believed that the public benefits when
lawyers continue to be recognized and treated like independent and
self-regulatory professionals. Cohen clearly believed that law should
be a profession,67 whereas Morgan is adamant that the concept of law
as a profession and lawyers as professionals is good neither for

59. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
60. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 20; see also
Morgan, Calling Law a Profession, supra note 2, at 5.
61. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
62. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 68–69.
63. Morgan, Toward Abandoning Organized Professionalism, supra note 2, at
976.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Maute, supra note 15, at 26 (describing how recent legislation in the
UK “identifies types of reserved legal activities”); Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW)
s 14 (Austl.) (outlining New South Wales’s general prohibition on unauthorized legal
practice, with exceptions).
66. See Maute, supra note 15, at 19–28 (providing a detailed history of events
leading up to the adoption of the Legal Services Act of 2007, including changes to the
proposed legislation that were made after members of the Law Society, judges, and
European bar associations objected to earlier proposals that would have limited
lawyer organizations to a lesser role than was finally adopted).
67. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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lawyers (at this time in history)68 nor for the public at large.69
Whether it is good for lawyers is perhaps beside the point. The more
important question is whether the public would be better off
jettisoning any meaningful concept of professionalism and thereby
regulating lawyers in the same manner as other, non-professional
occupations.
Morgan’s brief against the public benefits of lawyer self-regulation
is twofold. First, he argues that, historically, lawyers have not, in fact,
organized and regulated themselves in a manner that promotes the
public interest; as a result, there is no reason to assume they will do so
in the future.70 Second, he argues that, given the changes that have
produced globalization (including the internationalization of
commerce and the revolution in information technology), the
assumptions underlying the hypothetical contract that Freidson and
others have described are simply irrelevant “to the reality facing
lawyers today;”71 therefore, the public has no good reason to continue
allowing lawyers to play a significant role in regulating their own
conduct.
I agree that any claim that the history of lawyers represents “a long
tradition of professional training, self-regulation, and dedication to
public service” is patently false.72 I also agree that the early
campaigners for educational requirements, proficiency examinations,
licensing, and prohibitions against unauthorized practice were
motivated at least in part by a desire for both higher social standing
and state protection from market competition.73 I disagree, however,
that the motivations of these early professionalism campaigners—
either individually or in organizations like the ABA—were merely
protectionist or that professionalism did not, at least sometimes,
68. See, e.g., MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 128
(“Lawyers who do not take the new, inescapable realities seriously are going to find
themselves irrelevant to their clients, and thus irrelevant to those who matter to them
most.”).
69. See, e.g., id. at 129 (“[T]oday’s purchasers of legal services require their
services to be delivered promptly, at high quality, and potentially anywhere in the
world. [L]awyers and law firms must have the imagination and flexibility to deliver
legal services of the kind and in the manner clients are likely to require.”).
70. See, e.g., Morgan, Toward Abandoning Organized Professionalism, supra
note 2, at 973 (referring to Deborah Rhode’s call for a “culture of commitment,”
Morgan argues that “[i]t is possible that this kind of appeal to professional tradition
will have more effect in the future than it has had in the past, but it is hard to see
why”).
71. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 24.
72. Moore, supra note 24, at 782.
73. Id. at 781–82.
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perform a genuine public service at the same time that it enhanced
the standing and remuneration of the lawyers themselves.74
Both lawyer disciplinary codes and lawyer disciplinary enforcement
have evolved over time, and these changes have often benefited the
public. For example, lawyer disciplinary codes began as simple
statements of ideals that were not meant to be the equivalent of
statutes or regulations, or even the specific basis for lawyer
discipline.75 Through the adoption of the ABA Model Code and then
the ABA Model Rules (including the ongoing process of
amendment), lawyer ethics codes have become highly specific76 and
currently are used not only as a basis for disciplinary action, but also
as a standard of conduct underlying such remedies as lawyer
disqualification, malpractice, and breach of fiduciary duty lawsuits.77
As for disciplinary enforcement, the formation of bar associations and
the establishment of peer discipline replaced an earlier system of ad
hoc exercises of power by individual judges; most recently, courts
have reasserted their authority over lawyer regulation, creating courtsupervised agencies that employ staff lawyers to conduct both
investigations and prosecutions and that are beginning to include an
aspect of public oversight in their disciplinary processes.78 Many of
these beneficial changes in both the content of lawyer codes and the
“professionalization” of the disciplinary process came at the behest of
members of the organized bar, including the ABA Standing
Committee on Professional Discipline.79

74. Id. at 782–83 (citing more balanced accounts of the professional tradition and
modern scholars who “increasingly note both the benefits and the detriments of the
professionalization process”). In the end, it does not necessarily matter what the
motivations of professionalism proponents are if the net results of their efforts are
favorable for the public. Nevertheless, all things being equal, actors who are
genuinely motivated to serve the public interest are probably more likely to succeed
in their efforts than those who are not. In my work with the organized profession,
including my service as Chief Reporter for the ABA Commission on the Evaluation
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, I have observed many lawyers and
lawyer groups who, I am convinced, are sincerely motivated by the desire to promote
the public good.
75. See Nancy J. Moore, The Usefulness of Ethical Codes, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 7, 15.
76. See id.
77. See Nancy J. Moore, Restating the Law of Lawyer Conflicts, 10 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 541, 543 (1997).
78. See Nancy J. Moore, Mens Rea Standards in Lawyer Disciplinary Codes, 23
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 6 (2010).
79. See id.
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I am not so naïve as to ignore or even downplay the serious
detriments of having lawyers participate actively in their own
regulation. Undoubtedly, many of the rules adopted by or at the
behest of lawyers have not been in the public interest, including those
restrictions that the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently struck down80
and some that remain (at least theoretically) intact, such as unduly
broad prohibitions against the unauthorized practice of law by
nonlawyers.81 Nevertheless, before condemning in toto the process of
professional self-regulation, I would want to know what alternatives
were realistically available at any given point in time. For example, if
lawyer organizations had not promulgated rules of professional
conduct, what rules would govern lawyers’ use of client funds?82
Would the application of general fiduciary principles be as beneficial
to clients as the strict rules adopted in lawyer ethics codes?83 How
many clients would have benefited from the application of such
general fiduciary principles, given that they are usually applied only
in cases in which it is worthwhile for clients to file lawsuits against
80. See, e.g., MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 73–
79.
81. See generally Deborah Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981). As Morgan observes it is becoming increasingly difficult for
the legal profession to prevent nonlawyers from competing with lawyers in the
provision of legal services. See MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra
note 2, at 131 (American lawyers representing individual clients “are likely to find
themselves increasingly in competition with banks, insurance companies, investment
advisors, and other organizations that employ legally trained, salaried personnel”).
82. Model Rule 1.15 requires lawyers to strictly segregate client funds from the
lawyers’ own funds and to maintain and preserve complete records of client trust
accounts. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.15(a) (1983). This rule is often
interpreted to be a rule of strict liability, which means that lawyers may be disciplined
for trust violations even when such violations are unintentional, or even nonnegligent. See Moore, supra note 78, at 35–37. Sanctions for violations of this rule
are among the harshest sanctions imposed: many courts begin with a presumption
that absent compelling extenuating circumstances an intentional misuse of client
funds-—including intentional “borrowing” with an intent to repay—-is grounds for
disbarment. See, e.g., In re Addams, 579 A.2d 190 (D.C. 1990); see also In re Wilson,
409 A.2d 1153 (N.J. 1979) (stating that intentional misappropriation will, without
exception, result in disbarment). In addition, many states have adopted a system of
randomly selecting lawyers to produce their books and records to be audited. See,
e.g., In re Doughty, 832 A.2d 724 (Del. 2003) (disciplining a lawyer after a random
audit revealed frequently trust fund accounting violations).
83. For example, under common law principles, agents are generally subject to
duties to safeguard a principal’s funds and other property that are similar to those set
forth in lawyer conduct rules; unlike the lawyer conduct rules, however, an agent’s
common law duties are subject to modification upon the agreement of the principal.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.12 (2006).
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their lawyers?84 Would state legislatures have established client
protection funds for the reimbursement of clients whose funds were
misused?85 Would they have developed the system of random audits
of client trust funds that exists in many states today?86 What about
rules concerning client confidentiality and conflicts of interest?87 Is it
clear that leaving the development of such rules to common law or to
state legislation would have resulted in better protection for clients
and the public?88
It is not my purpose to prove or even to argue that the benefits of
self-regulation outweigh the costs. Instead, my position is that such a
question can be answered only after carefully identifying and
examining, for each historical period (including the present and the
future), not only the specific costs and benefits of self-regulation, but
also the advantages and disadvantages of alternative forms of
governance.89 In this respect, I find it noteworthy that elsewhere in
the world public representatives have studied the effects of
globalization and decided that, despite some glaring failures of selfregulation (particularly in the U.K., where the Law Society

84. Breach of a fiduciary duty may entitle a principal to obtain monetary damages
and non-monetary relief such as an injunction, but such remedies inevitably require
the filing of a lawsuit to obtain enforcement. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. d (2006) (discussing remedies available for breach of agent’s
duty to principal). Moreover, in the absence of random audits, a lawyer’s breach may
remain undetected, such as when a lawyer does not remit to the client all of the funds
to which the client is entitled upon settlement of a lawsuit or otherwise.
85. See generally ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROF’L CONDUCT 45 (2002)
(discussing client protection funds collected from lawyers through either mandatory
court assessment or through voluntary contributions and disbursed to clients
suffering financial loss as a result of a lawyer’s dishonesty when there is no
alternative source for reimbursement).
86. See supra note 82.
87. See, e.g., Moore, “In the Interests of Justice”, supra note 35, at 1789 (crediting
state bar associations for “initiating or supporting potentially far-reaching proposals,
such as those requiring lawyers to put fee agreements or conflicts waivers in
writing”).
88. See, e.g., id. at 1786–91 (arguing against suggestions that the public would be
better served by direct public regulation of lawyers through legislatures or
administrative agencies, using state court regulation of confidentiality as evidence
“that the present system is working pretty well, at least with respect to the
promulgation of ethics codes”).
89. See generally id. (arguing in favor of continuing self-regulation by lawyers,
including discussion of disadvantages of regulation by state legislatures or
administrative agencies because of possibility of “capture” by lawyer organizations
and the lack of public understanding of legal institutions and their role in “areas of
particular sensitivity” such as the representation of criminal defendants and the
allocation of decision-making authority).
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repeatedly ignored warnings concerning grave deficiencies in
processing client complaints),90 professional organizations can and
should continue to play an important (although not exclusive) role in
regulating legal practice.
Indeed, recent developments in the U.K. and in Australia might be
interpreted to reflect the following judgment: although lawyers
cannot necessarily be trusted to implement, on their own initiative,
appropriate rules governing restrictions on the various forms of legal
practice, including the structure of law firms and the role of
nonlawyer owners and managers (in both law firms and alternative
business structures), lawyers nevertheless may play a useful role in
developing beneficial standards for other aspects of legal practice,
including rules governing such important issues as conflicts of
interest, confidentiality, and the protection of client funds. They may
also play a beneficial role in the disciplinary process, whether by
acting as frontline regulators (as in the U.K. and in Australia) or by
continuing to note deficiencies in the current procedures and to
advocate for useful reforms91 (as in the United States, where court
agencies are typically the frontline regulators in the disciplinary
process)92. Using lawyers and lawyer organizations as co-regulators,
rather than as sole regulators (as they had previously been in the U.K.
and Australia), may be the right way forward, rather than insisting, as
Morgan appears to do, that lawyer organizations play no role in
regulating lawyers’ conduct. In other words, rather than look to
deprofessionalization, what lawyers and others ought to do is to work
toward a form of reprofessionalization, in which the contract between
society and the profession is modified to take into account the “need
for systems of regulation that are themselves fit for the new moral
and political economy.”93
90. See, e.g., Maute, supra note 15, at 20–24.
91. For example, it was the ABA that, based on developments in other countries,
recommended the creation of client protection funds in 1959. See ABA/BNA
LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 85.
92. See Mary Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the
United States, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911, 921–33 (1994) (describing the
development of disciplinary procedures from the use of volunteer lawyers to the
hiring of professional legal staff under court supervision).
93. Julian Webb, The Dynamics of Professionalism: The Moral Economy of
English Legal Practice—and Some Lessons for New Zealand?, 16 WAIKATO L. REV.
21, 37 (2008) (noting, in connection with developments preceding the adoption of the
Legal Services Act of 2007, that the debate had moved “beyond a crude deregulation
agenda” toward the establishment of regulations designed to be “efficient,
systematic, transparent and accountable”). Other commentators have characterized
the current period as one involving “postprofessionalism” as opposed to
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Morgan is perhaps most persuasive when he argues that the current
developments underlying globalization have created a reality in which
the assumptions underlying the current hypothetical contract between
law and society no longer hold true, making it unlikely that even a
more limited form of professionalism will result in a net benefit to the
public. For example, he argues that a growing proportion of the bar
is representing business entities rather than individuals and that
business clients—particularly those with in-house counsel—are
increasingly sophisticated, thereby making it likely that the typical
client is now in a good position to evaluate and direct its lawyers.94
Similarly, he argues that advances in information technology, coupled
with the rising disaggregation and commodification of legal services,
make it possible for persons who are trained in law (but who are not
lawyers) to master the discrete knowledge required for any particular
legal task,95 thereby undermining the sociologist’s understanding that
the practice of law necessarily requires “substantial intellectual
training and the use of complex judgments.”96 Indeed Morgan
concludes that, given the increasing specialization by lawyers, there is
no longer a “common body of knowledge” that lawyers “bring to bear
on a similar range of problems;” as a result, there is no reason to even
attempt to inculcate a “common professional identity” among lawtrained persons.97
In the long run, Morgan’s assessment of the implications of
globalization for the future practice of law may prove to be correct.
“deprofessionalization.” See, e.g., Kritzer, supra note 39, at 721 (describing
postprofessionalism as taking into account “changing patterns of political influence,
rationalization of knowledge, and the growth of technology as a tool of accessing this
knowledge”); see also Andy Boon et al., Postmodern Professions? The
Fragmentation of Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 32 J.L. SOC’Y 473, 487
(2005) (“Some may argue that we are seeing the decline of professionalism; others
may suggest that it is less drastic and can be interpreted as the modernization of
professionalism, in a ‘third way’ sense. Whichever assessment is correct, our
conceptions of professionalism are changing.”).
To me, the term
“postprofessionalism” does not adequately convey the extent to which the organized
profession continues to play a significant and meaningful role in the regulation of
lawyers in U.K. and Australia. The term “reprofessionalization” is designed to
suggest a reformulation of the manner and terms on which the organized profession
plays a role in its own self-governance, but I am not especially attached to this
particular formulation.
94. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 25, 110–23.
95. Id. at 91–98.
96. Id. at 22–23 n.12 (quoting sociologist Eliot Freidson’s definition of a
profession in connection with his work as a member of the ABA Commission on
Professionalism).
97. Id. at 129.
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Indeed, some commentators have already questioned whether lawyer
organizations in the U.K. can continue to play a meaningful role in
lawyer regulation, given both the proliferation of licensed legal
practitioners other than solicitors98 and the fragmentation of lawyers
that has resulted from increased specialization.99 The question,
however, is not whether Morgan will ultimately be proved right, but
rather whether lawyers and lawyer organizations should work to
prove him wrong, that is, whether there is at least some reason to
believe that reprofessionalism, along the lines suggested by the
current reforms in the U.K. and Australia,100 can work for the benefit
of the public in the United States and elsewhere.
In my opinion, there are several reasons to be optimistic in
assessing the outlook for the legal profession. First, aside from overly
restrictive regulations concerning the structure of law practice, the
current rules of professional conduct, particularly those concerning
such important issues such as conflicts of interest, confidentiality and
the protection of client funds, are generally beneficial and in
accordance with the public interest.101 Indeed, except for concerns
about lack of uniformity as a result of state court regulation,102 it is
unlikely that either state or federal legislation would produce a better
alternative.103 Second, lawyers and lawyer organizations have been

98. See, e.g., Boon et al., supra note 93, at 490 (questioning future role of Law
Society “[i]f lawyers will be only one component in a portfolio of practitioners
delivering legal services”); Maute, supra note 15, at 28 (noting the uncertainty
concerning the future roles of the Law Society and Bar Council, given that
membership is not voluntary and other entities represent the interests of other legal
professionals).
99. See, e.g., Webb, supra note 93, at 36 (raising questions concerning the
“capacity of a single regulatory body to maintain . . . its legitimacy, and its capacity to
regulate . . . [with] a single professional code”).
100. I do not purport to address the difficulty of importing the changes in the U.K.
and Australia to the United States or other countries, given the different manner in
which the profession historically has been regulated in different parts of the world.
For a discussion of the manner in which similar reforms might be adopted in the
United States, see generally Schneyer, supra note 15; Maute, supra note 15.
101. See supra notes 82–86 and accompanying text (protection of client funds);
supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text (confidentiality). For my assessment of the
lawyer rules on conflicts of interest, see Moore, supra note 77.
102. See, e.g., Maute, supra note 15, at 29–33 (discussing problems arising as a
result of “[b]alkanized state-based regulation”).
103. Elsewhere, in a co-authored article, I suggested “that it may be time for
Congress to impose national standards in selective areas, such as conflict of interest
rules for lawyers engaged in multistate or multinational practice.” Janine GriffithsBaker & Nancy J. Moore, Regulating Conflicts of Interest in Global Law Firms:
Peace in Our Time?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2560 (2012).
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largely or at least partially responsible for changes in other aspects of
lawyer regulation that likewise benefit the public, such as
improvements in funding for disciplinary enforcement and the use of
full-time disciplinary counsel,104 as well as the growing emphasis on
probation and diversionary programs that take single instances of
minor neglect or incompetence and handle them administratively in a
manner designed to protect the public by educating and assisting
lawyers to develop better practice standards.105 Finally, it may happen
infrequently in the United States, but there are times when an
independent legal profession does serve as an important “bulwark
against arbitrary government authority”106 or other oppression,107 as
recently happened when the legal community vehemently objected to
a top Pentagon official’s call for a corporate boycott of law firms
representing Guantanamo prisoners,108 resulting in the resignation of
that official.109

104. See, e.g., Mary Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures
in the United States, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911, 921–27 (1994) (discussing reforms
in disciplinary procedures, including providing adequate funding for professional
staff to process complaints under the centralized control of the state’s highest court,
as recommended in 1970 by the ABA’s Special Committee on Evaluation of
Disciplinary Enforcement, chaired by former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark
(known as the Clark Committee)).
105. See, e.g., ABA MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R.
11(G) (1986) (providing that “[s]ingle instances of minor neglect or minor
incompetence . . . should be removed from the disciplinary system and handled
administratively”). For a discussion of the “consumer-oriented” approach to lawyer
regulation, focused on client protection, see Leslie Levin, The Emperor’s Clothes and
Other Tales About the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM.
U. L. REV. 1, 25-28 (1998). For an analysis of the results of the diversion program
adopted in one state, see Diane Ellis, Is Diversion a Viable Alternative to Traditional
Discipline? An Analysis of the First Ten Years in Arizona, 14 PROF. LAW. 1, 13
(2002) (suggesting that lawyers completing the diversion program were statistically
less likely to become the subject of serious disciplinary complaints in the future).
106. Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding
Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1275 (1995) (describing but then rejecting this argument in
favor of an independent bar as “overstated”).
107. See Webb, supra note 93, at 44 (“Legal practice continues to play a significant
role in state formation and reconstruction; it is deeply [implicated] in the creation of
global capital, and, on a good day, the profession still has the power and the privilege
to act as a bulwark against oppression of many kinds.”).
108. Top Pentagon Official Calls for Boycott of Law Firms Representing
Guantanamo
Prisoners,
DEMOCRACYNOW!
(Jan.
17,
2007),
http://www.democracynow.org/2007/1/17/top_pentagon_official_calls_for_boycott.
109. Guantanamo Remarks Cost Policy Chief His Job, CNN (Feb. 2, 2007, 7:24
PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2007/US/02/02/gitmo.resignation/.
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The Pentagon call for a boycott illustrates not only the continuing
need for a legal profession that (among other public benefits) will
occasionally stand up against oppression, but also the ongoing
capacity for different segments of the profession to unite and express
a common understanding of their professional identity. Many of the
lawyers representing the Guantanamo prisoners are partners in the
largest and most prestigious corporate law firms—firms that have
committed substantial resources to provide pro bono representation
in an obviously unpopular cause.110 Thus, despite Morgan’s belief that
in today’s legal environment corporate lawyers have little in common
with criminal defense and legal services lawyers, the Guantanamo
episode proves, to the contrary, that broadly educated lawyers—
despite their location in different “hemispheres” of the bar111—
continue to have much in common with each other.112 This is a
hopeful sign that lawyers do indeed maintain a common identity,
something that is essential to the success of any professional project.
CONCLUSION
The title of this conference is “The Law: Business or Profession?
The Continuing Relevance of Julius Henry Cohen for the Practice of
Law in the Twenty-First Century.” I have said very little about
Cohen’s views, focusing most of my remarks in an attempt to refute
Morgan’s thesis that law is not and should not be considered a
profession in any meaningful sense of that term. I would like to
conclude, however, by addressing the continuing relevance, if any, of
the views expressed in Cohen’s 1916 landmark book The Law:
Business or Profession? for the debate going forward.

110. See supra note 108 (including remarks of Stephen Oleskey, a litigation and
real estate partner in WilmerHale, who was representing pro bono six Guantanamo
detainees).
111. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 111 (citing
John Heniz & Edward Laumann’s study of the Chicago bar, which divided lawyers
into the two separate “hemispheres” consisting of the corporate sector and the
individual/small business sector).
112. Despite Morgan’s previously stated belief that, given lawyer specialization,
there is no longer a “common body of knowledge” that lawyers “bring to bear on a
similar range of problems,” and thus no room for inculcating a “common professional
identity” among lawyers, see supra note 97 and accompanying text, recent studies
demonstrate that there is more mobility for lawyers now than in the past and that
new lawyers frequently move between different practice settings. See RONIT
DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE JD II: SECOND RESULTS FROM A NATIONAL STUDY
OF LEGAL CAREERS 54–55, 65–66 (2009).
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According to Sam Levine, one of the organizers of this conference
and an expert on Julius Henry Cohen, “Cohen’s book represents the
first full-length consideration of the business/profession dichotomy,
an issue that attracted considerable attention around the turn of the
century and has remained a perennial concern for legal scholars and
practitioners alike.”113 Cohen took the business/profession dichotomy
seriously, arguing that the increasing commercialization of law
practice threatened to reduce law from a profession to a business. In
other words, Cohen apparently believed that if law is treated like a
business or “trade,” then it cannot also be considered a profession.114
To some extent, these views are anachronistic. Here I agree with
Morgan that “the law/business labels are not alternatives”115 and that
the adoption of more bureaucratic, more efficient business methods
as part of modern conceptions of law office management are by no
means antithetical to the public interest. Indeed, the use of such
methods—including at least some lawyer advertising—may be
essential to increasing the availability of affordable legal services.116
Although some of Cohen’s views may no longer be useful in
assessing the status of the legal profession, the views of his that I find
most relevant today are those that emphasize the potential public
benefits of lawyers considering themselves to be professionals, with
duties that differ significantly from those of business persons
generally. With respect to self-regulation, I have already noted
Cohen’s observation that many lawyers volunteered their time each
year to “purging the profession of those who fall below the standards
of the profession itself.”117
These volunteers were extremely
important, as it was not until the 1970s that many states began to hire
113. Email from Samuel J. Levine to Nancy J. Moore (May 30, 2011) (on file with
author).
114. For example, Cohen wrote about “men who combine business skill with the
professional training of the law.” COHEN, supra note 1, at 211. He suggested that
readers “[w]alk into a modern law office and you will think you are in the executive
office of a large business institution.” Id. Cohen’s negative attitude toward such
lawyers is obvious in his conclusion that “[l]iving in such an atmosphere, with his
office window closer to the Stock Exchange than it is to Trinity Church . . . the
modern New York lawyer catches the atmosphere he breathes and fast loses the
larger perspective of his profession.” Id. at 212.
115. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER, supra note 2, at 101.
116. See, e.g., ABA COMM’N ON ADVER., LAWYER ADVERTISING AT THE
CROSSROADS: PROFESSIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 91–97 (1995) (finding that
lawyer advertising enables low-income families to find legal representation); id. at
130 (finding that lawyer advertising may decrease price of legal services and increase
access to lawyers).
117. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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staff lawyers to investigate and present disciplinary matters.118
Moreover, in addition to making the disciplinary system work as well
as it did, lawyer volunteers formed bar associations and staffed bar
association committees that not only drafted canons of ethics, but also
provided advice to lawyers concerned with the application of these
canons to situations arising in their daily practice of law.119 And while
some of the activities of bar associations may have been motivated by
or at least been entirely consistent with the interests of the lawyers
themselves (such as efforts to enjoin the unauthorized practice of
law), a substantial portion of the work of bar associations has been
directed toward distinguishing lawyers from others based on the
existence of heightened duties towards clients and others, particularly
courts.120
Sam Levine characterizes “Cohen’s dedication to his unique form
of professionalism” as based on “his insistence on independent
thinking, intellectual honesty, and analytical rigor.”121 As a result, it is
not surprising that Cohen himself readily acknowledged that some of
the very reforms he championed in the public interest were being
championed by other lawyers in a self-interested effort to control the
level of competition—a motivation he unconditionally rejected.122
Apparently, Cohen had a far more nuanced view of the
business/professionalism debate than many others of his time or even
of ours. And, as I have tried to demonstrate in this Article, what
globalization and the recent reforms in the U.K. and Australia
suggest to me is that U.S. lawyers should themselves adopt a more
nuanced view of the business/professionalism debate—one that
focuses very carefully on the question whether continuing to permit
lawyers to play a significant role in their own regulation is likely to
provide a net benefit to society, despite the costs that Morgan and
others have so correctly identified.

118. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
119. See COHEN, supra note 1, at xvi–xvii, 157–71.
120. See id. at 321–32 (Appendix A: Code of Ethics Adopted by the American Bar
Association, including Canons 1, 3, 9, 15, 17, 18, 21–23, 25, 30–31).
121. Levine, supra note 1, at 20.
122. COHEN, supra note 1, at 258.

